Think Like an Adversary
Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) is a methodology focused on securing the nation’s critical infrastructure (CI) systems. Developed at Idaho National Laboratory, CCE begins with the assumption that if CI is targeted by a skilled and determined adversary, the targeted operation can–and will–be sabotaged.
This methodology provides CI owners, operators, vendors and manufacturers with a more focused bottom line approach to:
- Determine most critical functions
- Evaluate complex systems
- Identify methods an adversary could use to compromise the critical functions
- Apply proven engineering, protection, and mitigation strategies to isolate and protect an industry’s most critical assets
Consequence-driven
INL leads executives and operational experts through identifying critical functions essential to fulfilling the organization’s mission and determine the potential consequences of a cyber-enabled sabotage against them.
Cyber-informed
Using the CCE methodology, INL guides system operators to identify key points within a critical system vulnerable to a cyber-enabled sabotage.
Engineering
INL then fully leverages an organization’s operational expertise, system understanding, and process knowledge to remove or reduce cybersecurity risks through engineering practices.
Safeguarding Critical Infrastructure Operations
CCE Methodology: A Four-Step Process
1. Consequence Prioritization
2. System-of-Systems Analysis
3. Consequence-Based Targeting
4. Mitigations and Protections
Case Studies
Information
Presentations
CCE Methodology Overview
1. Consequence Prioritization
Identify functions that must not fail and associated events that would trigger failure of those critical functions. Proceed with events that possess the greatest potential impact.
2. System-of-Systems Analysis
Identify, collect, and organize all information regarding critical systems involved in the Phase 1 events.
3. Consequence-Based Targeting
Develop scenarios to determine paths, targets, access, and information an adversary would need to achieve the events.
4. Mitigations and Protections
Develop mitigations and protections to prevent, limit, respond to and recover from an adversary carrying out the scenarios developed.
Information
Through support from multiple federal agencies, we provide a studied and proven methodology of multiple critical infrastructure and national security entities.
CCE Methodology Overview
Engineering out the cyber risk from things that must not fail.
CCE Methodology
1. Consequence Prioritization
Identify functions that must not fail and associated events that would trigger failure of those critical functions. Proceed with events that possess the greatest potential impact.
2. System-of-Systems Analysis
Identify, collect, and organize all information regarding critical systems involved in the Phase 1 events.
3. Consequence-Based Targeting
Develop scenarios to determine paths, targets, access, and information an adversary would need to achieve the events.
4. Mitigations and Protections
Develop mitigations and protections to prevent, limit, respond to and recover from an adversary carrying out the scenarios developed.
Case Studies
Information
Through support from multiple federal agencies, we provide a studied and proven methodology of multiple critical infrastructure and national security entities.
Presentations
CCE Methodology Overview
Engineering out the cyber risk from things that must not fail.
Collaborating Across Critical Infrastructure Sectors
In The News
Untrusting the Grid
More Hard Hats for Security Engineering!
Engineering Out the Cyber-Risk...
The End of Cybersecurity
Multimedia
Consequence Based ICS Risk Management
CCE: INL’s Approach to Securing Critical Industrial Infrastructure
CCE with Andy Bochman of INL
Social Media
Upcoming Events
ICS Joint Working Group - VIRTUAL JUNE 9-10
Resilience Week 2020, Salt Lake City, UT
Untrusting the Grid
Power Grid International, March 9, 2020
Article by Sean McBride, an Industrial Cybersecurity Program Coordinator at Idaho State University and a jointly appointed faculty researcher at Idaho National Laboratory.
More Hard Hats for Security Engineering!
Subtitled: Automation Engineers, You Already Know Almost Everything You Need
Medium.com, April 19, 2020
Article by Sarah Fluchs on S4x20 highlighting INL and its CCE work.
Engineering Out the Cyber-Risk...
RSA Conference 2019
It is dawning on critical infrastructure operators that even the best cyber-hygiene—the sum total of all we now do in cybersecurity—cannot be counted on to keep well-resourced attackers from touching their most critical processes and the systems that support them. This talk will introduce a new approach that draws from engineering first principals to take the highest value targets off the table.
The End of Cybersecurity
Harvard Business Review May 31, 2018
Digital, connected systems now permeate virtually every sector of the U.S. economy, and the sophistication and activity of adversaries–most notably nation-states, criminal syndicates, and terrorist groups–has increased enormously.
Consequence Based ICS Risk Management
SA4 January 2019
Dale talks with Andy Bochman about the Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) and John Cusimano about CyberPHA’s and lowering the maximum impact of a successful attack.
CCE: INL’s Approach to Securing Critical Industrial Infrastructure
Implementing consequence-driven Cybersecurity with continuous ICS monitoring & threat modeling.
CCE with Andy Bochman of INL
Dale Peterson podcasts with INL’s Andy Bochman to discuss INL’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering methodology (CCE) with emphasis on the often neglected consequence part of the risk equation.
The nation’s nuclear energy research laboratory.
ICS Joint Working Group - VIRTUAL JUNE 9-10
RESCHEDULED VIRTUALLY: We are pleased to let you know that our Virtual meeting is scheduled for June 9-10, 2020. Please share this information with others who are interested in the ICSJWG and who wish to collaborate with us in our continuing information sharing efforts and dedication to protection of critical infrastructure.
Resilience Week 2020, Salt Lake City, UT
Join us for the Resilience Week 2020 Symposium to discuss how private and public partners can work together to ensure a secure and reliable flow of energy across the nation.
In The News
Untrusting the Grid
Power Grid International, March 9, 2020
Article by Sean McBride, an Industrial Cybersecurity Program Coordinator at Idaho State University and a jointly appointed faculty researcher at Idaho National Laboratory.
More Hard Hats for Security Engineering!
Subtitled: Automation Engineers, You Already Know Almost Everything You Need
Medium.com, April 19, 2020
Article by Sarah Fluchs on S4x20 highlighting INL and its CCE work.
Engineering Out the Cyber-Risk...
RSA Conference 2019
It is dawning on critical infrastructure operators that even the best cyber-hygiene—the sum total of all we now do in cybersecurity—cannot be counted on to keep well-resourced attackers from touching their most critical processes and the systems that support them. This talk will introduce a new approach that draws from engineering first principals to take the highest value targets off the table.
The End of Cybersecurity
Harvard Business Review May 31, 2018
Digital, connected systems now permeate virtually every sector of the U.S. economy, and the sophistication and activity of adversaries–most notably nation-states, criminal syndicates, and terrorist groups–has increased enormously.
Multimedia
Consequence Based ICS Risk Management
SA4 January 2019
Dale talks with Andy Bochman about the Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) and John Cusimano about CyberPHA’s and lowering the maximum impact of a successful attack.
CCE: INL’s Approach to Securing Critical Industrial Infrastructure
Implementing consequence-driven Cybersecurity with continuous ICS monitoring & threat modeling.
CCE with Andy Bochman of INL
Dale Peterson podcasts with INL’s Andy Bochman to discuss INL’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering methodology (CCE) with emphasis on the often neglected consequence part of the risk equation.
Social Media
The nation’s nuclear energy research laboratory.
Upcoming Events
ICS Joint Working Group - VIRTUAL JUNE 9-10
RESCHEDULED VIRTUALLY: We are pleased to let you know that our Virtual meeting is scheduled for June 9-10, 2020. Please share this information with others who are interested in the ICSJWG and who wish to collaborate with us in our continuing information sharing efforts and dedication to protection of critical infrastructure.
Resilience Week 2020, Salt Lake City, UT
Join us for the Resilience Week 2020 Symposium to discuss how private and public partners can work together to ensure a secure and reliable flow of energy across the nation.
Sharing Actionable Resources
Papers
CCE FACT SHEET
Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of the U.S. Electric Sector
CCE Mission Support Center Concept Paper
The Need for Cyber-informed Engineering Expertise for Nuclear Research Reactors
Contacts
The Team
CCE FACT SHEET
Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of the U.S. Electric Sector
This paper seeks to illustrate the current cyber-physical landscape of the U.S. electric sector in the context of its vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, the likelihood of cyber attacks, and the impacts cyber events and threat actors can achieve on the power grid. In addition, this paper highlights utility perspectives, perceived challenges, and requests for assistance in addressing cyber threats to the electric sector.
CCE Mission Support Center Concept Paper
CCE participants are encouraged to work collaboratively with each other and with key U.S. Government (USG) contributors to establish a coalition, maximizing the positive effect of lessons-learned and further contributing to the protection of critical infrastructure and other national assets.
The Need for Cyber-informed Engineering Expertise for Nuclear Research Reactors
This paper examines the need for cyber-informed engineering practices that encompass the entire engineering life cycle. Cyber-informed engineering, as referenced in this paper, is the inclusion of cybersecurity into the engineering process. This paper addresses several attributes of this process and the long-term goal of developing additional cyber-safety basis analysis and trust principles. With a culture of free information-sharing exchanges, and potentially a lack of security expertise, new risk analysis and design methodologies need to be developed to address this rapidly evolving (cyber) threatscape.
ACCELERATE TRAINING
This two-day course provides participants with a fundamental knowledge of the CCE methodology focused on securing the nation’s critical infrastructure systems. Participants should be critical infrastructure owners, operators, vendors, and manufacturers.
To schedule training, please contact:
cce@inl.gov
Contacts
Cybercore Director
Scott Cramer
Phone: 208-526-2757
Email: scott.cramer@inl.gov
Deputy Director of Programs
Rob Helton
Phone: 208-526-6266
Email: robert.helton@inl.gov
Senior Grid Strategist
Andy Bochman
Phone: 781-962-6845
Email: andrew.bochman@inl.gov
CCE Program Manager
Rob Smith
Phone: 208-526-3881
Email: robert.smith@inl.gov
CCE Technical Advisor
Curtis St. Michel
Phone: 208-526-7064
Email: curtis.stmichel@inl.gov
Papers
CCE FACT SHEET
Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of the U.S. Electric Sector
This paper seeks to illustrate the current cyber-physical landscape of the U.S. electric sector in the context of its vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, the likelihood of cyber attacks, and the impacts cyber events and threat actors can achieve on the power grid. In addition, this paper highlights utility perspectives, perceived challenges, and requests for assistance in addressing cyber threats to the electric sector.
CCE Mission Support Center Concept Paper
CCE participants are encouraged to work collaboratively with each other and with key U.S. Government (USG) contributors to establish a coalition, maximizing the positive effect of lessons-learned and further contributing to the protection of critical infrastructure and other national assets.
The Need for Cyber-informed Engineering Expertise for Nuclear Research Reactors
This paper examines the need for cyber-informed engineering practices that encompass the entire engineering life cycle. Cyber-informed engineering, as referenced in this paper, is the inclusion of cybersecurity into the engineering process. This paper addresses several attributes of this process and the long-term goal of developing additional cyber-safety basis analysis and trust principles. With a culture of free information-sharing exchanges, and potentially a lack of security expertise, new risk analysis and design methodologies need to be developed to address this rapidly evolving (cyber) threatscape.
Training
ACCELERATE TRAINING
This two-day course provides participants with a fundamental knowledge of the CCE methodology focused on securing the nation’s critical infrastructure systems. Participants should be critical infrastructure owners, operators, vendors, and manufacturers.
To schedule training, please contact:
cce@inl.gov